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Between October 1973 and January 1974 the Mideast oil
cartel raised the posted price of petroleum from $3.00 to $11.65
per barrel. In February 1975, Eli Black, President of United
Brands, jumped to his death in mid-Manhattan. These seem-
ingly unrelated events coalesced in the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
Among other provisions, the Act contains severe tax penalties
for U.S. persons who agree to participate in or cooperate with
an international boycott or who bribe foreign officials.
The Arab boycott of Israel can be traced to 1946 when the
Arab League declared that products of Palestinian Jews were
to be considered undesirable in Arab countries. The year 1948
witnessed the creation of Israel, a de jure state of war between
Israel and the Arab nations, and the Arab boycott office. All
three still exist today. Until recently, however, the boycott was
honored in the breach. With the quadrupling of oil prices and
the multiplication of Arab economic power, boycott practices
which previously existed mainly on paper were suddenly imple-
mented and became a matter of concern-to Arab nations, to
Israel, and to the United States Congress.'
* The authors are associated with the United States Treasury Department. The
views expressed are opinions of the authors and should not be construed to reflect the
views of the Treasury Department.
** Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade and Investment Policy, United States
Deparment of the Treasury. Formerly Director, International Tax Staff, United States
Department of the Treasury.
*** Economist, Office of International Monetary Affairs, United States Depart-
ment of the Treasury. Formerly Economist, International Tax Staff, United States
Department of the Treasury.
1. Wall St. J., June 25, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
590 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Overseas bribery, like the boycott, has existed for many
years. Boycott concern was triggered not by sensational new
bribes, but by front page revelation of longstanding practices.'
Two bills were introduced during the second session of the
94th Congress to deal with these problems. On March 15, 1976,
Senator Ribicoff and others introduced S. 3138, specifically
aimed at the boycott of Israel. On March 16, 1976, Senator
Harry Byrd, Jr., introduced S. 3150, aimed at the bribery of
foreign officials. Over the serious misgivings of Senator Long,
the two bills were melded together and included in the Senate
Finance Committee version of H.R. 10612. 3 They passed the
Senate essentially unchanged on August 6, 1976. Since the
House had enacted no legislation on bribes or boycotts, the
issues went to conference.
Bills were also introduced by Senators Stevenson and Wil-
liams,4 and by Representatives Koch and Bingham5 to address
the boycott problem through tighter language in the Export
Administration Act.' Among other features, these bills would
have mandated disclosure of corporate boycott reports by the
Commerce Department; prohibited U.S. firms from furnishing
information pursuant to a boycott request on the firm's direc-
tors, officers, shareholders, or employees; and prohibited a re-
fusal to deal with other U.S. firms pursuant to a boycott. There
were differences between the House and Senate versions relat-
ing both to the scope of prohibited actions and to private dam-
2. The Wall Street Journal pursued the corporate expose with great diligence. See,
e.g., the following articles: Dec. 4, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed Aircraft Corp.); Nov.
26, 1975, at 2, col. 1 (Castle & Cooke, Inc.); Nov. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Lockheed
Aircraft Corp.); Nov. 14, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (Exxon Corp.); Oct. 20, 1975, at 20, col. 2
(American Home Prod. Corp.); July 14, 1975, at 10, col. 2 (Exxon Corp.); July 14, 1975,
at 1, col. 6 (Del Monte Corp.); June 12, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (auditing procedures); May
21, 1975, at 5, col. 1 (Gulf Oil Corp.); May 21, 1975, at 4, col. 2 (United Brands Co.,
Del Monte Corp., Castle & Cooke, Inc.); May 19, 1975, at 2, col. 3 (Gulf Oil Corp.);
May 19, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (U.S. oil company subsidiaries in Italy); May 15, 1975, at 3,
col. 2 (Ashland Oil, Inc.); May 9, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (general practice of U.S. firms
abroad); April 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (United Brands Co.).
3. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 557-68 (1976).
4. S. 3084, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
5. H.R. 5377, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
6. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970). Relevant committee reports include: Housa
COMM. ON INT'L RFATIONS, EXTENDING THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION Acr, H.R. REP. No.
1469, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); SUaCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., THE ARAB
BoYcoTr AND AMERICAN BuSINESS (1976).
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age suits. While a Senate filibuster prevented the naming of
conferees in the 94th Congress, a conference bill on amend-
ments to the Export Administration Act was reported in the
first session of the 95th Congress with the blessings of the Busi-
ness Roundtable (170 officers of major U.S. corporations) and
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and was enacted
on June 22, 1977. 7
B. Administration Response
The Ford Administration, and particularly the Treasury,
applauded the goals of the 94th Congress but was unenthusias-
tic about new legislation in the context either of the Tax Re-
form Act or the Export Administration Act Amendments. Sec-
retary Simon testified that existing U.S. anti-boycott measures
were effective, that the Arab countries were liberalizing their
boycott rules, and that new legislation might lead to confronta-
tion and more rigid attitudes in the Middle East.8
The Treasury specifically objected to the tax measures
contained in the Ribicoff Bill (S. 3138) for the following rea-
sons:
9
(1) Existing legislation under the Export Adminis-
tration Act, the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the Civil
Rights Acts is more suited to dealing with the prob-
lem.
(2) New legislation might have an adverse impact
on trade and investment in the Arab League coun-
tries.
(3) The possibility is at best small that the Arab
countries would change their policies as a result of
new legislation.
(4) Tax legislation would impose a severe adminis-
trative burden on the Internal Revenue Service.
In connection with the Ford Administration's concerns, it
may be noted that U.S. exports to Arab nations in 1976 were
7. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235,
amending 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
8. Statement by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon before the House
Committee on International Relations, in Department of the Treasury News Release
No. 915 (June 9, 1976).
9. Letter from Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon to Senate and House
conferees on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Aug. 26, 1976; Letter from Assistant Secre-
tary for Tax Policy Charles Walker to Senator Russell Long, May 25, 1976.
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approximately $8 billion. Total merchandise exports from all
countries to the Arab nations amounted to some $60 billion for
1976; thus, U.S. sales already accounted for only 13 percent of
the total. In addition, U.S. firms were carrying out Middle East
construction contracts of approximately $20 billion, about one-
half of the total outstanding contracts in the area. New con-
tracts are vulnerable to competition from European and Japa-
nese firms. On the other side of the ledger, U.S. imports of oil
from the Arab countries amount to approximately 17 million
barrels per day, some 30 percent of U.S. consumption. Mean-
while, the United States is a major depository for liquid funds
from Arab countries, and the total of these funds could reach
$40 billion by 1980.
At one time the Ford Administration might have had a
choice between the Export Administration Act approach and
the Tax Reform Act approach. However, instead of negotiating
with Congress for one approach or the other, the Administra-
tion opposed both measures. 10 As a result, the 94th Congress
enacted the tax legislation and the 95th Congress enacted the
trade legislation."
C. Tax Reform Act of 1976
The Conference Committee on the Tax Reform Act did not
significantly alter the Senate language concerning foreign
bribes. 12 Basically, the law provides that DISC (Domestic In-
ternational Sales Corporation) and deferral benefits are lost
with respect to the amount of any bribe paid directly or indi-
rectly to an official, employee, or agent of any government.
Further, the earnings and profits of a foreign corporation pay-
ing a bribe are not reduced by the amount of the bribe.
After prolonged and sometimes heated discussion, how-
ever, the Conference Committee did significantly narrow and
10. President Gerald Ford endorsed the anti-boycott provisions of the Tax Reform
Act of 1976 in his second televised debate with James Carter on Oct. 6, 1976, rather to
the surprise of Administration officials who had been working the halls of Congress in
an opposite direction.
11. The complexity and magnitude of the anti-boycott legislation, with its accom-
panying regulations and reporting requirements, sired the Anti-Boycott Bulletin pub-
lished by the MIDDLE EAsT MONTHLY, which deals exclusively with boycott issues.
12. The Senate bill treated the loss of tax benefits in terms of "bribe-produced
income" while the Conference Committee related the loss of benefits to the amount of
the bribe. Further, the Conference Committee deleted the Senate provision which
would have denied foreign tax credit for bribe-produced income.
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revise the Senate boycott provisions,' 3 The Senate bill would
have denied to all income from all boycotting countries the tax
benefits associated with DISC, deferral, the foreign tax credit,
and the exclusion from gross income of foreign earned income,
even if a taxpayer had agreed to participate in the boycott at
the behest of only one country. The Conference measure
dropped the foreign earned income exclusion and set forth a
proportional test for determining the extent to which tax bene-
fits are denied. The Conference approach denies the various tax
benefits in accordance with the ratio of sales, purchases, and
payroll arising from boycott activity to total foreign sales, pur-
chases, and payroll of the taxpayer. Alternatively, the taxpayer
may specifically identify foreign taxes and income attributable
to boycott activities and lose only the U.S. tax benefits asso-
ciated with the specifically attributable taxes and income.
The Conference bill also carved out exceptions in the defi-
nition of an "international boycott" so as not to proscribe the
kinds of trade restrictions which the United States itself has
imposed from time to time, most recently on trade with Cuba
and North Vietnam.
The definition of "participation in or cooperation with" an
international boycott is fundamental to the anti-boycott provi-
sions. The basic elements of the definition were first introduced
by Senator Ribicoff. The Ribicoff bill" focused on the require-
ment that a taxpayer agree to participate in or cooperate with
an international boycott before being subjected to tax sanc-
tions. The requirement of an agreement remained intact
throughout deliberation on the bill.'5 The seemingly simple
concept of an agreement raises thorny factual issues which
must ultimately be resolved on a case-by-case basis. These
issues have long bedeviled the Sherman Antitrust Act and
promise to be equally difficult in the boycott legislation.
Participation in or cooperation with an international boy-
cott is also defined in terms of refraining from doing business
with boycotted individuals, companies, or countries. Under the
13. H.R. REP. No. 1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). See also STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., SUMMARY OF THE CONFERENCE AGREE-
MENT ON THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1976 (Comm. Print 1976).
14. S. 3138, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
15. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3).
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law, the benefits of DISC, deferral, and the foreign tax credit
are lost to the extent a taxpayer agrees to refrain from doing
business in furtherance of an international boycott.
D. Export Administration Act Amendments of 1977
While the boycott provisions of the Tax Reform Act"6 and
the Export Administration Act 7 are parallel in many respects,
there are significant differences, both as to triggering events
and as to penalties. The tax provisions are triggered by a boy-
cott agreement; boycott actions are relevant only insofar as
they establish the existence of an agreement. By contrast, the
trade provisions are triggered by boycott actions; and
agreement is relevant only if it is carried out. Violation of the
anti-boycott provisions of the Export Administration Act re-
sults in criminal penalties while violation of the anti-boycott
provisions of the Tax Reform Act results in the denial of tax
benefits. This difference of course implies a higher standard of
proof (including proof of culpable intent) to obtain a conviction
under the Export Administration Act than to impose penalties
under the Tax Reform Act. s Middle level corporate executives
are the likely target of the Export Administration Act, whereas
corporate profits are the target of the Tax Reform Act. The
Treasury Department is responsible for administering the Tax
Reform Act, and the Commerce Department is responsible for
administering the Export Administration Act. All these differ-
ences necessarily mean that the standards of behavior required
under the Tax Reform Act are not precisely the same as the
standards of behavior required under the Export Administra-
tion Act - much to the frustration of affected corporations and
individuals.
Prohibited actions under the Export Administration
Amendments are similar (but not identical) to those in the Tax
Reform Act. The actions prohibited by the Export Administra-
tion Act include: 9
16. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525, amending INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954.
17. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235,
amending 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
18. On the other hand, it may be inherently more difficult to prove the existence
of an agreement than to prove the occurrence of particular actions.
19. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, § 201(a).
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(1) Refusing, or requiring any other person to re-
fuse, to do business with or in a boycotted country,
with any business concern organized under the laws
of the boycotted country, or with any national or resi-
dent of the boycotted country.
(2) Refusing, or requiring any other person to re-
fuse, to employ or otherwise discriminate against any
U.S. person on the basis of the race, religion, sex, or
national origin of that person or of any owner, officer,
director, or employee of that person.
(3) Furnishing information on the race, religion,
sex, or national origin of any U.S. person or any
owner, officer, director, or employee of a U.S. person.
(4) Furnishing information about whether any per-
son has, has had, or proposes to have any business
relationship with or in a boycotted country, with any
business concern organized under the laws of the boy-
cotted country, or with any national or resident of the
boycotted country.
(5) Furnishing information about whether any per-
son is a member of, has made contributions to, or is
otherwise associated with or involved in the activities
of a charitable or fraternal organization which sup-
ports the boycotted country.
(6) Paying, honoring, confirming, or otherwise im-
plementing a letter of credit containing a prohibited
boycott condition.
The Export Administration Amendments provide certain
exceptions to the prohibited actions. These exceptions include:
(1) Compliance with requirements prohibiting the
importation into the boycotting country of goods or
services from the boycotted country or any business
organized under the laws of the boycotted country, or
compliance with requirements prohibiting the ship-
ment of goods to the boycotting country on a carrier
of the boycotted country, or by a route other than
that prescribed by the boycotting country or its na-
tionals.
(2) Compliance with certification requirements
contained in import and shipping documents as to
the country of origin, name and nationality of the
1977
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carrier, route of shipment, and the name of the sup-
plier.
(3) Compliance with the unilateral and specific
selection of goods and services by a boycotting coun-
try or its nationals.
(4) Compliance with export requirements relating
to shipments or transshipments of exports.
(5) Compliance with immigration or passport re-
quirements.
(6) Compliance by a U.S. person resident in a for-
eign country with local law with respect to that per-
son's activities in that country.
The Commerce Department is now preparing rules and
regulations to implement the Export Administration Amend-
ments; preliminary rules must be issued within 90 days from
enactment of the statute (June 22, 1977), and final rules must
be issued within another 120 days.
E. Treasury Guidelines and Other Procedures
As the first step in administering the anti-boycott provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,2o the Secretary of the
Treasury issued Guidelines consisting of questions and answers
relating to the denial of certain tax benefits for participation
in or cooperation with an international boycott. The first set of
Guidelines was issued on November 4, 1976; 21 a supplementary
set of Guidelines was issued on December 30, 1976.22 In re-
sponse to congressional criticism, primarily from Senator Ribi-
coff, the Carter Administration reviewed the Guidelines issued
by the Ford Administration. This review culminated in a pub-
lic hearing on April 29, 1977, chaired by Laurence N. Wood-
worth, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy. Six witnesses made
statements and numerous written comments were submitted.
The Carter Administration published a revised set of
Guidelines on August 12, 1977, superseding all previous Guide-
lines.13 These Guidelines will be followed by the Internal Reve-
20. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1525, amending INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954.
21. Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines; International Boycotts, 1976 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 49, at 17 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines I].
22. Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines; International Boycotts, 1977 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 5, at 19 [hereinafter cited as Guidelines II].
23. Tax Reform Act of 1976 Guidelines; International Boycotts, 42 Fed. Reg. 41504
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nue Service and the Treasury in requiring the filing of taxpayer
reports, in making determinations as to participation in or co-
operation with an international boycott, and in computing the
loss of tax benefits associated with boycott participation or
cooperation.2'
As an additional step in administering the boycott provi-
sion, the Internal Revenue Service issued a revenue procedure
setting forth the procedures for the issuance of
"determinations" under section 999(d) relating to whether a
particular activity constitutes participation in or cooperation
with an international boycott. 2s Further steps in the adminis-
tration of the law involved the publication of temporary and
proposed regulations relating to the computation of the inter-
national boycott factor,2" and the issuance of Form 5713,
"International Boycott Report," 7 to be used by taxpayers in
fulfilling their reporting obligations under the anti-boycott pro-
visions of the Tax Reform Act.
I. INTERNATIONAL BoycoTts
A. Exception for Certain Boycotts
Not all boycotts are bad. The United States itself has a
history of boycotting foreign nations. Thus, the boycott legisla-
tion contains certain safe havens which permit the same kinds
of trading restrictions which the United States itself has im-
posed in recent years under the authority of the Trading with
(1977). These August 12, 1977 Guidelines contain new questions and answers and
revisions to the first and second sets of Guidelines. To a large extent, however, the
August 12, 1977 Guidelines carry over the questions and answers contained in the
earlier Guidelines. Changes in the Guidelines which result in an increase in the report-
ing burden or tax liability of a person will be effective after August 22, 1977. The same
numbering system is used in all three sets.
24. The Guidelines interpret the statute and the Conference Committee Report.
While the Conference Committee was open to the public, and a transcript was main-
tained, little weight was given to that transcript in preparing the Guidelines. After the
statute itself, Conference Committee Reports are regarded as the best indication of
legislative intent. The appropriate weight to be given to a Conference Committee
transcript is not well defined, particularly when the transcript amplifies or conflicts
with the statute or the Committee Report. Public disclosure of Conference transcripts
is a new occurrence , untested by the judicial system. However, for purposes of inter-
preting a statute, the courts may give substantial weight to contemporaneous state-
ments made by a bill's sponsors.
25. 1977 INT. REv. BULL. No. 14, at 16 (proposed 26 C.F.R. 7.999-1).
26. Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7.999-1; Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1 (1977).
27. Department of the Treasury, Form 5713, International Boycott Report, May
1977
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the Enemy Act" and the Export Administration Act. 29 Thus, a
taxpayer may agree to meet requirements imposed by a foreign
country with respect to any manner of international boycott if
United States law, regulations, or Executive Orders sanction
that boycott.30 In addition, whether or not there is a U.S. sanc-
tion, a taxpayer may agree to comply with either a prohibition
on the importation of goods produced in whole or in part in any
country which is the object of an international boycott3 l or a
prohibition on the exportation of products to a country which
is the object of an international boycott.2
B. Boycott Agreements
Tax benefits are denied under the boycott provision of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 only when a taxpayer agrees to partici-
pate in or cooperate with an international boycott.3 3 The tax-
payer is punished not for deeds, but for an agreement to com-
mit those deeds. The mere fact that a taxpayer refrains from
hiring Jews, refrains from doing business with a U.S. company
on the Arab blacklist, or refrains from shipping on blacklisted
vessels is not sufficient, in and of itself, to result in a loss of
tax benefits. The taxpayer must agree to refrain from these
activities to be affected by the anti-boycott sanctions con-
tained in the Tax Reform Act of 1976. The Treasury Guidelines
focus on the requirement of an explicit or implicit agreement,
either written or oral.34 When there is no explicit agreement,
the existence of an agreement will not be inferred solely from
the fact that a taxpayer has refrained from activities enumer-
ated in the legislation.35 However, a clear pattern of refraining
from certain business arrangements could indicate that the
taxpayer has agreed to refrain from these activities, and the
burden would be on the taxpayer to establish otherwise. Thus,
28. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-44 (1970).
29. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
30. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(4)(A).
31. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(4)(B).
32. INT. RED. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(4)(C).
33. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3).
34. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 23 (Qs. H-1, H-2).
35. Id. at 24 (Q. H-5). The answer to H-5 was tightened in the revised Guidelines
of August 12, 1977, to provide that a course of conduct "is evidence that, together with
other evidence, could be sufficient to establish an implied agreement." A similar in
terrorem caution was added to the prefatory material in the August 12, 1977 Guide-
lines in item (g).
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an overall course of conduct could support an inference that an
agreement exists, even though component parts of that con-
duct, by themselves, would not.
3
1
The Guidelines draw a fine distinction between the per-
mitted act of recognizing the application of a country's laws,
regulations, requirements, or administrative practices37 and the
prohibited act of complying with those laws, regulations, re-
quirements, or administrative practices. 38 The distinction is
further developed in the hypothetical case of a subsidiary or a
branch that acknowledges in its incorporation or registration
documents that local laws apply to it, including local laws that
implement a boycott. In this hypothetical case the acknowl-
edgement of local law does not constitute a boycott agreement
or support the inference that an agreement exists.
3
1
Letters of credit and accompanying certificates are an-
other area where fine lines have been drawn. Under the Novem-
ber 4, 1976 Guidelines, a bank could honor (with no loss of tax
benefits) a letter of credit which required the bank to confirm
that the payee has furnished a certificate of boycott compli-
ance.4 0 The reasoning of the November 4, 1976 Guidelines was
that the bank had not itself refrained from the activities listed
in section 999(b)(3). The August 12, 1977 Guidelines reverse
this result. The bank, by confirming the certificate of boycott
compliance contained in a letter of credit is now deemed to
have entered into an agreement. By confirming the letter of
credit with a boycott certificate, the bank is deemed to agree
36. Question H-14, for example, deals with the hypothetical example wherein a
construction contract with a boycotting country specifies a list of permissible subcon-
tractors. Such a contract indicates a pattern of exclusion; however, the general con-
tractor might be able to show that the nonlisted companies were excluded for reasons
unrelated to the boycott. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 25.
37. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 24 (Q. H-3). The August 12, 1977 Guidelines
include a provision in the answer to H-3, noting that a course of conduct of complying
with local boycott laws, regulations, requirements, or administrative practices may be
evidence of an agreement to comply.
38. Id. at 24 (Q. H-4). This distinction parallels the language of the Conference
Committee Report, S. REP. No. 94-1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 466-67 (1976). By
contrast, the Export Administration Amendments provide an exception to the prohib-
ited actions whereby a person can comply with or agree to comply with local law.
39. Id. at 24 (Q. H-7).
40. Id. at 27 (Q. H-29). The Export Administration Amendments specifically
prohibit the paying, honoring, confirming, or otherwise implementing a letter of credit
containing boycott conditions.
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to refrain from doing business with any other U.S. persons that
might not have been able to furnish a boycott certificate. The
bank will therefore lose its tax benefits. Further, if a bank
promises a boycotting country that it will not honor letters of
credit relating to the export of goods to a boycotted country,
the bank will lose its tax benefits." Such a promise would
amount to an agreement to refrain from doing business with
the government, companies, or nationals of a boycotted coun-
try.
These distinctions and others mirror the fine lines that
resulted from the legislative compromises underlying the stat-
ute and the Conference Report. Congress apparently intended
to put some pressure on taxpayers with operations in boycot-
ting countries without abruptly terminating all U.S. business
activity in the Middle East.
C. Related Boycotts and Related Persons
If a taxpayer has agreed to an international boycott spon-
sored by one country, he is presumed to have agreed to cooper-
ate with all countries associated in carrying out that interna-
tional boycott. 2 Further, if a person controls or is controlled
by"3 a corporation which participates in or cooperates with an
international boycott, the controlling person or the controlled
person is presumed to participate or cooperate in the boycott."
The taint of participation and cooperation thus spreads from
one boycotting country to another and from one related corpo-
ration to another. If a person agrees to the Libyan boycott of
Israel, that person will be presumed to have agreed to the Syr-
ian boycott of Israel. Further, if corporation A agrees to boycott
Israel, related corporation B will be presumed to have agreed
to boycott Israel. However, these presumptions of taint may be
rebutted if a taxpayer can clearly demonstrate that he or a
41. Id. at 27 (Q. H-30).
42. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(1).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 304(c) sets forth the relevant test of control as the
ownership (actual or constructive) of stock possessing at least 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote, or at least 50 percent of
the total value of shares of all classes of stock.
44. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(e)(1)-(2). Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q.
D-1). Note that under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(1), a person includes an
individual, trust, estate, partnership, association, company, or corporation.
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member of a controlled group of corporations 5 of which he is a
member, has separate and identifiable operations that were not
involved with the international boycott."6
D. Types of Boycott Activity
An agreement to participate in or cooperate with an inter-
national boycott may involve any one of five different types of
activity.
The first type of boycott activity involves refraining from
doing business with or in a boycotted country.47 A borderline
example illustrates this case: A company owns a number of
ships, some of which call at the boycotted country and some
of which call at the boycotting country. The ships calling at the
boycotting country refrain from calling at the boycotted coun-
try. This is not considered participation in or cooperation with
an international boycott; the shipping company has not re-
frained from doing business with the boycotted country since
some of its ships call there.45
The second type of boycott activity involves refraining
from doing business with any U.S. person engaged in trade in
a boycotted country.49 Again borderline examples illustrate the
rule. A U.S. company may agree to refrain from doing business
with a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company without refraining
from doing business with a U.S. person.50 Further, a bank
which provides financial advice may agree to refrain from rec-
ommending for investment by a boycotting country the shares
of U.S. companies engaged in trade in a boycotted country.5
The rationale is that the bank itself has not agreed to refrain
from doing business with the issuing companies. Finally, a
bank managing an investment portfolio for a boycotting coun-
try may agree to refrain from purchasing stocks or bonds issued
by certain companies on the theory that the concept of "doing
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 993(a)(3) defines a controlled group of corporations.
46. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Qs. D-1, D-2).
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(i).
48. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 28 (Q. 1-2).
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(ii). Section 7701(a)(30) defines the
term "United States person" to mean: (A) a citizen or resident of the United States;
(B) a domestic partnership; (C) a domestic corporation; and (D) any estate or trust
(other than a foreign estate or foreign trust).
50. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 28 (Q. J-4).
51. Id. at 29 (Q. J-5).
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business" with a company does not encompass the purchase of
that company's securities.5
The third type of boycott activity involves an agreement
to refrain from doing business with any company whose owner-
ship or management is made up, in whole or in part, of individ-
uals of a particular nationality, race, or religion. 53 The fourth
type involves an agreement to refrain from employing individu-
als of a particular nationality, race, or religion.54 These last two
anti-boycott provisions parallel the concerns of civil rights leg-
islation. The basic standards established under that legislation
are carried over in the Guidelines.
55
The fifth and final type of boycott activity relates to condi-
tional sales agreements which require refraining from shipping
or insuring products on a carrier owned, leased, or operated by
a person who does not participate in or cooperate with an inter-
national boycott. 5 The Guidelines provide a war risk safe
haven rule: compliance with precautionary shipping measures
designed to avoid the risk of confiscation of goods does not
involve participation in or cooperation with an international
boycott .
E. Tax Penalties
Current U.S. taxation of the undistributed earnings of a
foreign subsidiary, current taxation of DISC earnings, and de-
nial of the foreign tax credit all occur if a firm agrees to an
international boycott. The actual amount of benefits denied
depends not only on the extent of participation and cooperation
but also on the method used to compute the reduction of tax
benefits.
There are two alternative methods for computing the loss
of tax benefits. A taxpayer can use the international boycott
factor, or the taxpayer can determine the taxes and income
specifically attributable to his boycott activities. 5
52. Id. at 29 (Q. J-6).
53. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(iii).
54. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(A)(iv).
55. Guidelines 1, supra note 21, at 29-30 (Qs. K,L).
56. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(b)(3)(B). Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 30-32
(Part M).
57. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 31 (Q. M-5). A similar exception is contained
in the Export Administration Amendments.
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c).
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The international boycott factor is intended for use pri-
marily by taxpayers who cannot clearly separate boycott and
nonboycott operations. The international boycott factor is a
fraction. The numerator of the fraction reflects the operations
of a person (or of the controlled group) which are related to all
countries associated in carrying out a particular international
boycott, and is determined by computing the sum of purchases
made from, sales made to or from, and payroll paid or accrued
for services performed in these countries minus the amount of
purchases, sales, and payroll clearly demonstrated to be attrib-
utable to nonboycott operations in these countries." The de-
nominator of the fraction reflects the worldwide' operations of
that person (or controlled group) and is determined by comput-
ing the sum of purchases made from, sales made to or from, and
payroll paid or accrued for services performed in any country
other than the United States."
Using the international boycott factor method, the reduc-
tion in tax benefits resulting from a boycott agreement is deter-
mined by multiplying the otherwise allowable tax benefit by
the taxpayer's boycott factor. In the case of DISC and deferral,
the law operates by requiring a deemed distribution to the
shareholders of the DISC"2 or to the shareholders of the con-
trolled foreign corporation 3 of the amount found by multiply-
ing undistributed earnings by the factor. Alternatively, under
the specifically attributable method, the amount deemed dis-
tributed to the shareholders of the DISC or to the shareholders
of the controlled foreign corporation is the amount of income
specifically attributable to the boycott operations."
The method of computing the reduction of the foreign tax
credit differs depending on whether the international boycott
factor or the specifically attributable taxes and income method
is used. If the international boycott factor is used, the reduc-
59. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(1). See Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7.999-1;
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1 (1977).
60. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(3) defines "worldwide" to mean operations
in or related to countries other than the United States.
61. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(1). See Temporary Treas. Reg. § 7.999-1;
Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.999-1 (1977).
)2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 995(b)(1).
63. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 952(a).
64. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(c)(2).
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tion in the foreign tax credit is determined by computing the
foreign tax credit that would be allowed under section 901 for
the taxable year as if section 908 (relating to boycotts) had not
been enacted. The section 901 credit encompasses both the
direct credit and the indirect credits allowable under sections
902 and 960. The section 901 credit is subject to the limitations
of both section 904 (the overall limitation) and section 907 (the
special limitation for oil related income). If a person partici-
pates in a boycott, the credit allowed under section 901 is re-
duced by the product resulting from multiplying the section
901 credit (before the application of the section 908 reduction)
by the international boycott factor.65
If a taxpayer can clearly demonstrate the amount of for-
eign taxes and earnings which are allocable to his boycott oper-
ations, the international boycott factor need not be used. "6 In-
stead, the reduction in foreign tax credit is computed by reduc-
ing the amount of foreign taxes paid, before determination of
the section 904 limitation, by all foreign taxes not specifically
attributable to nonboycott operations.
67
The taxes which are not creditable either by application
of the international boycott factor method or the specifically
attributable method are deductible, despite the general rule
that a taxpayer cannot in a given taxable year claim both a
credit and a deduction for foreign taxes.68 Moreover, no recom-
putation of the section 901 credit nor the section 904 limitation
is made after the deduction.
69
F. Reporting Requirements
The boycott legislation imposes extensive reporting re-
quirements both on individual taxpayers and on the Secretary
of the Treasury. In some instances, the reporting burden may
turn out to be the heaviest penalty of the statute. Generally,
any U.S. person or any other person that either claims the
benefit of the foreign tax credit under section 901 or owns stock
in a DISC is required to report to the Internal Revenue Service
65. Guidelines 1I, supra note 22, at 22 (Q. N-1).
66. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999 (c)(2); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q. D-
3).
67. Guidelines IT, supra note 22, at 22 (Q. N-i).
68. INT. REV. CODE OF i954, §§ 78, 275(a)(4), 908(b).
69. Guidelines II, supra note 22, at 22 (Q. N-2).
VOL. 6:589
1977 TAXING BOYCOTTS AND BRIBES
if it has operations in or related to a boycotting country. 7" Boy-
cotting countries, for purposes of reporting under the statute,
include two groups of countries: first, those countries on the
Secretary's list of countries 7' which currently require or may
require participation in or cooperation with an international
boycott and, second, any other country in which the person
required to file the report (or a member of a controlled group
which includes that person) has operations and which the per-
son knows or has reason to know requires any person to partici-
pate in or cooperate with an international boycott. 2
A person required to file an international boycott report
under section 999(a) will fulfill this requirement by filing a new
Internal Revenue Service Form 5713, "International Boycott
Report Form. '73 These reports will be submitted as part of the
taxpayer's income tax return and, therefore, will be accorded
the same degree of confidential treatment under section 6103
as any other information contained in an income tax return.
74
70. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(a); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 17 (Q. A-I),
provides that a person is required to report if he: (a) has operations; or (b) is a member
of a controlled group, a member of which has operations; or (c) is a U.S. shareholder
(within the meaning of section 951(b)) of a foreign corporation that has operations, but
only if a U.S. shareholder owns (within the meaning of section 958(a)) stock of that
foreign corporation; or (d) is a partner of a partnership that has operations; or (e) is
treated under section 671 as the owner of a trust that has operations in or related to a
boycotting country. Additionally, if a person controls a corporation (within the mean-
ing of section 304(c)) and either that person or the controlled corporation is required
to report under section 999(e), that person must report whether the controlled corpora-
tion participated in or cooperated with the boycott. The controlled corporation must
make the same report with respect to the operations and reports of the person control-
ling it. See text accompanying notes 75-77 infra for exceptions to the reporting require-
ments.
71. International boycotting countries included on the list published by the Secre-
tary, effective Nov. 4, 1976, are as follows: Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Lybia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
Arab Republic, and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen. 1976 INT. REV. BULL.
No. 49, at 17. As of August 1977, the list has not been changed.
72. Boycotts sanctioned by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 999(b)(4)(A), (B), or (C)
are not included for purposes of this reporting requirement.
73. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 18 (Q. A-5). The "International Boycott Re-
port" will cover the same time period as the taxpayer's income tax return. In the case
of a controlled group, all persons required to report under section 999(a) shall report
for all members of the controlled group for the taxable years of those members which
end with or within the taxable year of the controlled group's common parent that ends
with or within the taxable year of the reporting person. In the event no common parent
exists, the members of the controlled group shall elect the tax year of one of the
members to serve as the common tax year for the group. Id. at 19 (Q. A-13).
74. Id. at 18 (Q. A-6). In this respect, the reports differ from those submitted to
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Reports by taxpayers are waived in certain circumstances.
Taxpayers are not required to report participation in or cooper-
ation with an international boycott if the operations are sanc-
tioned by section 999(b) (4), unless the boycotting country is on
the list maintained by the Secretary of the Treasury.75 A foreign
corporation need not file an international boycott report for any
taxable year unless it claims the benefits of the foreign tax
credit under section 901 or owns stock in a DISC.76 Other waiv-
ers are provided for special situations.77
The Secretary of the Treasury must report to Congress
annually on the administration of the boycott provision.7 The
Secretary is also required to maintain and publish quarterly a
current list of countries which require or may require participa-
tion in or cooperation with an international boycott.79
G. Determinations
In dealing with boycotts through the tax statutes, Con-
gress realized that the burden of proof would be shifted to the
taxpayer once the Internal Revenue Service asserted a defi-
ciency. This was no doubt a welcome feature to Senator Ribi-
coff and other sponsors. By the same token, it was obviously a
matter of concern to affected companies. In the tug and haul
of legislative compromise, a novel procedure was devised. Upon
request from a taxpayer, the Secretary of the Treasury is di-
rected to issue a "determination" with respect to whether a
particular operation of a taxpayer, or a member of a controlled
group which includes that taxpayer, constitutes participation
in or cooperation with an international boycott.80 Assuming the
the Commerce Department under the Export Administration Act (50 U.S.C. app. §
2406(c)). In October 1976, President Ford announced that reports submitted under the
Export Administration Act would be made public.
75. Id. at 17 (Q. A-i).
76. Id. at 19 (Q. A-12).
77. See, e.g., Guidelines II, supra note 22, at 20 (Qs. A-14, A-17, A-18).
78. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1067(a) requires the Secretary to set forth: (1) the
number of international boycott reports filed; (2) the number of such reports indicating
international boycott participation or cooperation; and (3) a detailed description of the
administration of the boycott provision. The Conference Report invites the Secretary
to provide additional information which would be helpful in evaluating the legislation.
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(a)(3).
80. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 999(d). While section 999(d) provides that a tax-
payer may request a determination in advance of an operation, or before the end of a
taxable year in which the operation is carried out, the Secretary may decline to issue
such a determination before the close of the taxable year.
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taxpayer's factual statements are correct, the determination
will be binding for purposes of a subsequent audit. The deter-
mination and background documents relating to it will be sub-
ject to public inspection, unlike an international boycott re-
port."
H. Effective Date Provisions
Generally, the reporting requirements and tax sanctions
apply to boycott agreements made after November 3, 1976, and
to agreements made on or before November 3, 1976, that con-
tinue after that date.82 However, operations on or before Nov-
ember 3, 1976, are also reportable if the taxpayer enters into a
boycott agreement after the November 4, 1976, effective date.8'
The Act contains a binding contract rule. Under this rule,
the tax sanctions and reporting requirements apply only to
boycott agreements made on or after September 2, 1976, and
to agreements made before that date that continue after De-
cember 31, 1977.4
A person may renounce existing agreements to participate
in or cooperate with an international boycott by communicat-
ing his renunciation to the government or person with whom
the agreement was made.85 A renunciation will avoid the tax
penalties otherwise imposed.
III. FOREIGN BRIBES
The foreign bribe provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1976
denies the benefits of deferral and DISC for the amount of any
illegal payment made by or on behalf of a controlled foreign
corporation or a DISC to an official, employee, or agent of any
government.8 The benefits of deferral are denied by treating
the amount of illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments as
subpart F income, as defined in section 952(a). The benefits of
81. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 23 (Q. G-1). A determination will be treated
as a "written determination" within the meaning of section 6110(b)(1) and will be
subject to the rules set forth in section 6110(c).
82. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1066(a)(1); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 21 (Q.
E-1).
83. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q. E-1).
84. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1066(a)(2); Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 20 (Q.
E-). Special transition rules are set forth in Questions E-2 and E-3. Id. at 21.
85. Guidelines I, supra note 21, at 22 (Q. E-5).
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 952(a)(4), 995(b)(1)(iii). These provisions apply to
all illegal payments made after Nov. 3, 1976. Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1066(b).
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DISC are denied by treating the amount of illegal bribes, kick-
backs, or other payments as distributions under section
995(b)(1). Further, the amount of illegal payments may not be
used to reduce the earnings and profits (or to enlarge the defi-
cit) of a foreign corporation.
8 7
Illegal bribes, kickbacks, or other payments are defined
under section 162(c). Such payments have long been disal-
lowed as a deduction for U.S. tax purposes when they are con-
sidered unlawful under the laws of the United States or under
any generally enforced law of a state.88 Penalties are now pro-
vided for illegal payments made by foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations. The significance of the foreign bribe legislation is
that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations can no longer
disregard the U.S. tax consequences of illegal payments.
In an attempt to uncover corporate tax evasion and avoid-
ance schemes involving illegal bribes, kickbacks, and other
payments, the Internal Revenue Service initiated an audit pro-
gram characterized by the so-called "eleven questions" even
before the Tax Reform Act was passed. Under this program,
the auditors ask corporate officials, key employees, and ac-
countants eleven specific questions concerning illegal bribes,
kickbacks, and other payments.8 9 Responses to the questions
must be provided in writing and under oath. U.S. companies
and their foreign subsidiaries that are engaged in bribing for-
eign officials now run the dual risk of additional U.S. tax liabil-
ity and, if the illegal payments are concealed, U.S. perjury
charges.
IV. SUMMARY OBSERVATIONS
A. Novelty and Complexity
The international boycott and foreign bribe provisions,
like the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Trading with the
Enemy Act, are extraterritorial in scope. Like the accumulated
earnings tax and the personal holding company tax, the boy-
cott and bribe provisions are used for penalty purposes. Fi-
nally, like the gambling and narcotics excise taxes, the purpose
of the boycott and bribe penalty is not to collect revenue but
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 964(a).
88. Tress. Reg. §§ 1.162-18(a)(4), 1.162-18(b)(2) (1977).
89. Department of the Treasury News Release, No. IR-1590 (Apr. 7, 1976).
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to further public policy. What is novel in the new legislation is
not the individual elements but the combination of extraterri-
toriality, penalty, and non-revenue considerations in a single
provision. Whether this combination is viewed as a wise or
improvident use of the tax law depends very much on the ob-
server.
The sanctions imposed by these provisions may bear little
relation to the offense. Moreover, benefits denied under the
boycott provision depend as much on the method of computa-
tion as on the extent of participation and cooperation. For ex-
ample, the taxpayer can select either the international boycott
factor method or the specifically attributable method for com-
puting tax benefits denied. Depending on the extent of their
excess foreign tax credits, some taxpayers who use the specifi-
cally attributable method will incur no tax penalty, even
though they cooperate fully with an international boycott. The
same can be true of a U.S. corporation that bribes foreign offi-
cials using the earnings of a highly-taxed foreign subsidiary.
This paper testifies to the complexity of the tax statute.
When a compromise law is drafted under severe time pressures,
the result, as in this case, can easily resemble a lawyers' and
accountants' relief act. The Export Administration Act
Amendments, enacted after longer Congressional deliberation,
seem simpler and clearer - in defining prohibited actions, in
defining exceptions, and in stipulating penalties. Unfortun-
ately, pride of legislative authorship may well preclude harmo-
nization or merger of the Tax Reform Act provisions with the
Export Administration Act Amendments.
B. Tax Treaty Implications
The Model U.S. Income Tax Convention, as well as some
existing U.S. income tax treaties, guarantee a foreign tax credit
for taxes paid to a treaty partner. Denial of the foreign tax
credit for participation in or cooperation with an international
boycott might be construed as a violation of these treaty provi-
sions. The Treasury Department believes that the boycott leg-
islation does not conflict with existing treaties, but merely
amends U.S. law in a manner generally contemplated by the
treaty language. For example, Article 23 (Relief from Double
Taxation) of the U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, which
has language similar to that of many existing treaties, provides
that "subject to the limitations of the law of the United States
1977
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(as it may be amended from time to time without changing the
general principle thereof), the United States shall allow . . . a
credit against. . . United States tax."10 This language specifi-
cally permits changes in U.S. law, provided the general princi-
ples of the foreign tax credit are not disturbed. The boycott
provision is just such a change.
C. Revenue Impact
At best, it is difficult to estimate the revenue consequences
of changes in taxation of international transactions. The reve-
nue impact of a given change may depend on complex interac-
tions between U.S. and foreign tax laws, the foreign tax credit
limitation, and methods of organizing business enterprises. All
these difficulties were inherent in the bribe and boycott provi-
sions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. To make matters worse,
it is customary to express revenue estimates as point estimates
rather than range estimates. Point estimates convey a false
sense of precision, particularly for the boycott and bribe provi-
sions.
With these caveats, the revenue estimates of the Senate
and Conference Committee versions of the boycott and bribe
provisions were estimated as follows, by fiscal year:
Millions of Dollars'
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
House - - - - -
Senate 142 100 100 100 100
Conference 32 70 70 70
- nil
*Less than $5 million
90. Department of the Treasury, Model Convention Between the Government of
the United States of America and the Government of. . . for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, May 18, 1976.
91. Source: COMMITTEE ON CONFERENCE, TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. REP. No.
94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 634 (1976).
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At least 90 percent of the revenue projected in the Conference
bill is related to boycotts and no more that 10 percent to bribes.
A rough breakdown might be (in millions of dollars):
Boycott provision: denial of -




Total, Conference bill, 1979 70
Revenue estimates are intended to show the impact of a change
in law prior to any economic response. But a major reason for
passing the bribe and boycott legislation was to persuade com-
panies to change their business methods. There are a number
of ways affected companies and countries can adjust their prac-
tices:
(1) They can stop participating in boycotts and
they can stop paying bribes.
(2) Foreign countries can stop requiring participa-
tion in boycotts, and they can impose effective local
sanctions against bribery.
(3) Companies with boycott and bribe activities can
attempt to isolate those activities from other lines of
business to avoid contamination.
While it is by no means certain that this legislation will
have a significant revenue effect, the provisions are important.
Senior officials of any prudent company will think twice before
becoming mired in audit controversy and possible litigation
over boycotts and bribes.
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